## IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY 1 STATE OF OKLAHOMA 2 3 UNITED METHODIST CHURCH OF THE SERVANT, an incorporated religious association acting by 4 and through its Board of 5 Trustees, Plaintiff, 6 CASE NO. CJ-2023-3704 7 VS. 8 THE OKLAHOMA ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, 9 INC., a domestic not for profit corporation; THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE OKLAHOMA ANNUAL 10 CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED METHODIST, INC., a domestic not 11 for profit corporation, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 14 TRANSCRIPT OF RULING OF THE COURT ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 15 FOR TEMPORARY AND/OR PERMANENT INJUNCTION ALONG WITH 16 REQUEST FOR EMERGENCY SETTINGS AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT 17 PRONOUNCED ON THE 21ST DAY 18 OF AUGUST, 2023, BY 19 THE HONORABLE ALETTA HAYNES TIMMONS 20 ATTORNEY'S COPY 21 22 Reported by: 23 Tara Nixon, RPR, CRR, CRC 24 321 Park Avenue Oklahoma County Courthouse 25 Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 73102

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3	ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF:
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14	MR. ROSS PLOURDE Attorney at Law
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17	ALCO DEBCENTE.
18	ALSO PRESENT:
19	Ms. Monica Wittrock
20	Representative for Plaintiff
21	Mr. Kenton Fulton, Esq.
22	Chancellor for Conference
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(Begin Excerpt)

THE COURT: Well, I've heard testimony and the evidence with regard to the second matter; went back and reviewed the Book of Discipline, Section 248, also the disaffiliation process under 2553, and then the Disaffiliation Agreement, and there are a number of things that struck this Court's attention.

When I looked at the decisions that were entered, 1424 and, I can't remember the number of the other one, Decision No. 1425, I didn't find them to be helpful in the analysis in this case with regard to the particular disaffiliation agreement of the Oklahoma Annual Conference.

The Oklahoma Annual Conference had the right, under both those cases, to set forth the agreement that the local church who had voted and had disaffiliation vote that supported disaffiliation, had to sign those agreements in order to complete the process of disaffiliation, those agreements were drafted by church, the National Church and their boards and councils, and they, under 2553, are not contemplated until such time as there's been a vote and a two-thirds majority of the local churches reach that disaffiliation threshold.

And I... under just neutral contract principles,

I don't -- it makes no legal sense to argue that that disaffiliation agreement that is unsigned by either of the parties governs 2553 at this juncture. No one signed it, and it may be that they're required to sign it at some point, but we don't have any consent, we don't have a meeting of the minds in regular contractual terms with regard to the disaffiliation agreement, and that analysis doesn't even come into play until after subparagraph (4)(A) has been met.

So to argue that it controls in these circumstances with regard to waiting a year, makes no legal sense and flies in the face of just basic contract law, but in addition to that, there is testimony that no one else has been subject to a one-year waiting period.

And the Court has been particularly disturbed in both of these cases with unprecedented action on behalf of the National Church in what appears to be direct contravention of the processes afforded to everyone else who wanted to disaffiliate, and it seems to have been enacted, and I believe that the proof in this case substantiates the burden that the measures taken with regard to The Church of Servant was arbitrary, arbitrary and was not required of

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anyone else. And, in fact, a church was allowed to vote again within a year, the Gould Church, I believe, was allowed to vote in a year on disaffiliation and was allowed to disaffiliate.

We also have a process that, to me, is tainted by the stated bias of the district superintendent. He demonstrated an acrimony and a behavioral antipathy to the disaffiliation process. some testimony, and I don't ever remember it getting run to ground, about him denying the vote of disaffiliation to an Edmond church. Now, there was also some testimony that it was his understanding they didn't really want to vote for it or not, but he testified he doesn't like the disaffiliation agreement, he doesn't like the process. And that for him to be in a position over a church who wants to try to disaffiliate, and to use that animus in a way that, to me, is not in keeping with Section 2553 on its face, to reach to an agreement that no one signed at this point, that hasn't even become part of the equation, because he won't allow the vote, gives him the right of choking off the rights of the churches underneath him when it comes to disaffiliation.

And my tone and tenor this entire time has been,

if you're going to put a process in place, you've got to follow it. You don't have the ability to follow some and not others and then reach for other conditions that are not required and have not been required of anyone else, except for Church of the Servant in this case. That, to me, is troublesome with regard to my analysis of whether under neutral contract provisions and policies, and law, the Church has followed its own dictates.

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You know, a lot of times when you do contracts sometimes you look at it later on and you don't like the result of it, but contract law is you're stuck with that, whether you like it or not. I looked at 2553, in there does not appear to be any limit on the number of times a party or a church can ask to be disaffiliated. It's not in there. And, in fact, if you want to talk about the disaffiliation agreement, it, in particular, lends itself to the interpretation that in its very terms there is contemplated more than one disaffiliation vote, and that's found on Page 5, last paragraph of the August 2022 version, and also on Page 6, beginning at the last paragraph on that page, going over into the next page of the June 2023 version that has the one year in it, but even that says that a church can

request another conference and vote but they have to have the approval of and consultation with the district superintendent or until the passage of 12 months. So even that, even though that didn't happen in this case, even that contemplates that there can be more than one disaffiliation vote, and it does not, in that paragraph, say you have to wait a year. It's in the disjunctive. It says "or".

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Looking at 248, which is the provision that talks about when church conferences can be held, I read it to see if whether or not there was anything in it that said that the church council could not call for a vote. And when I looked at 248 it appears that the district superintendent can call for a vote, and also the church council. It is also in the disjunctive, and that makes sense, because if you had a district superintendent who had an animus toward disaffiliation, they could use their position as a chokehold and that any churches underneath them will not be able to disaffiliate, and that's not the tenor and the tone of Section 2553. That so in order to read 248 and 2553 in conjunction with each other and to give full force and effect to both, 2553 would have no ability to be applicable if you had a district superintendent who just said, I'm

never going to call for a vote. I'm not going to allow you to do it, they could choke out disaffiliation for the entire district by doing that. I don't believe that's what's contemplated under 2553 and reading them both together.

There's also some evidence that the date for the deadline of the submission of documents and the paperwork necessary for the disaffiliation to be presented at the annual conference was moved up earlier than the previous years. And I heard that there were reasons for that, but, to me, if those reasons are adequate, and the Church has the right to do that, the timeline is suspect, because it conveniently is set at a time that if you put the year timeline in place means that this church will forever be unable to vote on disaffiliation and go through the process. It completely cuts them out of their ability to disaffiliate, by setting the date on that date.

You know, I don't know if that's what the Church did, but that's the effect of what they did. And the vote to disaffiliate is the chokepoint, it's a chokepoint in these cases, in both of these cases, for either the church's right to vote on disaffiliation, or not. That is significant to me.

And when they set the date with this disaffiliation prior history it was significant that no one talked to the church council about it, the people who were the ones who called for it to start out with, about setting a date that significantly and unalterably kept them from voting on whether they wanted to leave or stay.

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When I talked -- when I asked, I asked a couple of questions and listened for the answers, and then listened to the testimony. The only two cases where the superintendents failed or delayed the vote on disaffiliation has been Church of the Servant and First Church. The only two. I don't believe that's a coincidence, and I believe that the disaffiliation under 2553 has been frustrated by the actions of the National Church and the Oklahoma Annual Conference. They're the parties that drafted the Disaffiliation Agreement. The National Church was involved in the Section 2553, Disaffiliation, and by its very terms seeks to allow people to leave without the things that I've seen go on in these court proceedings. It was specifically drafted to allow churches to leave if they so chose; that purpose has been frustrated.

Court finds that irreparable harm will be the result if a temporary restraining injunction is not

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enforced or is not granted, because Church of the Servant will never be allowed to vote on disaffiliation if the Respondents' actions are not enjoined.

I also, based upon the law and the facts in this case, believe, and think, that there is a likelihood that the Petitioner on the temporary restraining order will have success on the merits.

So this Court's ruling with regard to the injunction is that Church of the Servant be allowed to vote on disaffiliation as contemplated under Section 2553 and as a result of the request of the church council that has not been acted on in a manner that would allow them to vote prior to September the 6<sup>th</sup>, 2023, so that they may be ready and able to participate in the disaffiliation process on or before that date.

And will find that the church council also has the right under 248 to call a vote on disaffiliation because 248, in conjunction with 2553, lend credence to the fact that the church council can call the vote for disaffiliation, along with the district superintendent, especially in this case, where I find that the disaffiliation process was tainted by the animus of Rev. Powers or Dr. Powers, who has a

demonstrated history and who testified that he is not in favor of disaffiliation and does not believe that the agreement or the process is something that he thinks, I'm saying loosely, should not happen and shouldn't be done.

He testified, in essence, to that on the witness stand. So his being a district superintendent over Church of the Servant at this particular time has tainted the process in a way that has made his denial of their request for a church conference to vote on disaffiliation arbitrary and not in keeping with both 248 and 2553, the Book of Discipline.

And I also specifically find that the disaffiliation agreement, in terms of its tenants regarding the process, does not come into play until and after a vote has been done and disaffiliation has been approved by two-thirds of the church, the local church. And so, while it may be instructional after disaffiliation has been voted on and two-thirds have voted to disaffiliate, it does not govern under 248 and 2553, the process prior to that time, and that's contemplated in Section 2553 of the Book of Discipline, at subparagraph 4.

And notwithstanding the two opinions, I'm still, I still don't know whether subject to final editing

with regard to both of those means that they're final in such a way that they inform my actions in this case, but even if they are final, I do not find them to be helpful or instructive with regard to 2553 in this particular case and particular issues that have been found to have occurred in this matter. And that's my ruling.

Now I am required to set a bond in this case, so I'm going to set a date for a bond hearing.

Charles, do you have my docket on the computer there?

THE CLERK: How far out?

THE COURT: Huh?

THE CLERK: How far out do you want to set a date?

THE COURT: Do you all have any idea about how far out you want to set the bond hearing?

MR. PLOURDE: I mean, I think the statute provides that the injunction isn't operative until a bond has been posted, so it's really the --

MS. PLAXICO: I don't think -- Sorry. I didn't mean to interrupt.

MR. PLOURDE: Go ahead.

MS. PLAXICO: The realities, Your Honor, are we have a very short period of time.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. PLAXICO: We need to notice the congregation and have the vote, and it seems to me, in all due respect, that it makes more sense to have a vote, because we don't know how the vote is going to come out. So there's no harm, I don't think there's any harm anyway, but even argument of harm, depending on the vote. So we give 10 days notice.

THE COURT: I'm talking about a bond hearing.

MS. PLAXICO: Maybe bond hearing early

September. I'm just saying, I'm not sure that it's relevant as to even argue any type of damages --

MR. PLOURDE: Judge --

MS. PLAXICO: Either way.

MR. PLOURDE: -- I think the statute makes it relevant.

THE COURT: I'm looking at the Temporary
Injunction. I'm looking at 12 O.S. 1381, and 1388
says, "An injunction binds the party from the time
he has notice thereof, and the undertaking required
by the applicant therefor is executed."

So you've got to do them both. So it binds from the time you have notice, and the undertaking required by the applicant thereunder is executed.

MR. PLOURDE: I think it's 1392 that has the

language that indicates that there's not --

THE COURT: Yeah. 1388 says the same thing, too, though. It says "and the undertaking required by the applicant therefor is executed."

So all right. I'm going to set a bond, a surety bond of \$200,000 for the property, and then another \$100,000 for attorney fees, so a \$300,000 bond. It can be by surety or cash. And the injunction will be in effect pursuant to statute, and that's 13, Section 1388 and Section 1392.

Any further questions? And I believe that's the amount that the Respondent requested in the other case.

MR. PLOURDE: I'm sorry. I don't recall what
was requested in the other case, Judge, but --

THE COURT: I think that was in your Motion to Set Bond. You said 200,000 would be appropriate, maybe.

MR. PLOURDE: That's correct.

MS. PLAXICO: In First Church that's what they argued, which was a, you know, again, a different remedy. But we're happy to argue to the Court, but it sounds like you've made a decision though, right?

THE COURT: Yeah. "The Conference submits an appropriate bond in that chase is \$200,000, in their

motion to require bond, that was filed July 27<sup>th</sup>, so that's where I got the number from. All right?

Anything further?

MR. PLOURDE: Your Honor, I prepared orders regarding the denial of the Motion to Dismiss and the denial of the Oral Motion to Stay, and sent them to --

THE COURT: Has the other side seen it? And let me say this, the last time you prepared ruling on my Motion to Dismiss, all you said was the Court denied the Motion to Dismiss. And I didn't sign it, and gave it back, and then ordered a more, I thought, complete recitation of my ruling be done, and I think that was done. So if it's one of those ones that just says, you know -- because I don't just do motions to dismiss and don't have a substantive reason for it.

So that's why I wouldn't sign your preferred Motion to Dismiss, because it just said it was denied, and it didn't set the reasons I had actually denied it based on the law, and that's why it wasn't signed. So if this is one of those --

MR. PLOURDE: It is, Judge.

THE COURT: All right. So, and I said, when I ruled on the Motion to Dismiss, it was based on the

same authorities that I had ruled on prior. So I expect the Motion to Dismiss ruling to look like that.

MR. PLOURDE: Okay.

THE COURT: Based on the same grounds that I gave in the First Church.

MR. PLOURDE: And on our Oral Motion to Stay it says that our Oral Motion to Stay is denied. Is that going to be satisfactory, Judge?

THE COURT: That is.

MR. PLOURDE: And I'll go back and prepare an Order on the Motion to Dismiss that is identical as I can make it to the First Church case.

THE COURT: All right. Bearing in mind that the facts in there may not be exactly the same. All right? So conform it based on the law and then my legal analysis of the Motion to dismiss. All right.

(An off-the-record discussion was here had.)

THE COURT: And then last, but not least, I know that there are going to be requests for the court reporter to transcribe these, and I just want to say this on the record. I have one of the hardest working court reporters in this whole building. She's nationally certified. And what happens in this courtroom, if she's in here all day long, then

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what that means is, it's going to take her probably two to three days to transcribe what happens in the courtroom. This is not the only thing we've got going on. All right?

So when you ask for a transcription, and I want you to ask for it on the record, so we can all be clear. Because when Ms. Plaxico asked for the transcription on the record, she asked for the ruling only. And, Mr. Plourde, I don't know whether you asked for the same thing or you asked for the three days of hearings that we had, but that's not going to take two or three days. All right? Seven to 14 days is expedited. All right? And so, when she leaves this courtroom and goes back to the back, after she's been out here all day transcribing, it's going to take two or three days per day of hearings for her to get that transcribed, in addition to the fact that you're not the only case we have. We had other cases that were also emergent where she had transcripts.

So I'll take a lot of heat up here, and I'm better at shucking it off. But when you accuse my court reporter of not doing the best job she can possibly do, I have seen her work until she almost was stupefied trying to get transcripts out. No

sleep; working all weekends. Then I don't appreciate that, especially if you don't know what it takes to do what she does, and I do. I see her do it, day in and day out.

So if you've got a question about why stuff is done the way it is and what she's doing, first of all, you be clear on what you want, first of all. You didn't ask for three days of transcript. You said you wanted what Plaxico wanted, that's my understanding, and all she wanted was the ruling. All right? This is a emergency matter.

We have another emergency matter where transcripts are being required. So if we're going to do justice, you've got to get in line like everybody else. Okay? We'll do the -- she's doing the best she can to get them out as fast as she possibly can, and she's one of the fastest reporters I've ever seen. I've litigated cases. I know how long it will take people to get stuff done. So she will get them done as fast as she can, as fast as humanly possible.

Do we understand what I'm saying?

MS. PLAXICO: Absolutely, Your Honor. Thank you.

MR. PLOURDE: Yes, Your Honor. And --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. PLOURDE: -- just -- First of all, we do request an expedited transcript. And please give us the deposit required and we'll pay that.

Secondly, there was some confusion --

THE COURT: What are you considering expedited transcript? What are your expectations of what that is?

MR. PLOURDE: I don't have expectations --

THE COURT: Apparently, you do.

MR. PLOURDE: It's the Supreme Court that has expectations.

that you need an expedited transcript. They wouldn't do that. They haven't told you that. Okay? And somebody up there, and if they don't know, I'm telling them on this transcript today, that when you have a three- or four-day hearing, with dockets in between, where she's in the courtroom transcribing -- we had 55 cases on our docket the week before that needed transcriptions. Then the week, last week we had another 40 something cases, and she had four transcriptions to do from there. So she works harder than I do.

MR. PLOURDE: I appreciate that, Judge, and, you

know, I don't want to judge how hard you work and I
know --

THE COURT: No, I mean, I'm telling you. You can take that to the bank. I'm telling you that.

I'm telling you that.

MR. PLOURDE: All we did -- all I did was advise the Supreme Court, here is the status of the transcript.

THE COURT: And you wanted an expedited transcript of three days, three days worth of testimony, in how long? And then I think she got them in 14 days, or less, and was criticized for that.

MR. PLOURDE: I haven't criticized her --

THE COURT: I don't take kindly to that at all.

MR. PLOURDE: I have not criticized her for anything, Judge, and the record speaks for itself.

THE COURT: It does speak for itself.

MR. PLOURDE: Everything I have said is on file with the Supreme Court so, and I'll stand by that.

I'm not accusing her of anything. She got it turned around --

THE COURT: Well, it read like it to me, and I read it --

MR. PLOURDE: She got it turned around very

quickly and I appreciate that.

THE COURT: Well, that's not what you told them.

MR. PLOURDE: All I can do is advise the --

THE COURT: That's not what you told them.

MR. PLOURDE: -- court, you know, what I was being told as far as when it was going to be prepared --

THE COURT: And then, let me say this. Court reporters are not quite State employees and not quite County employees, so the equipment they have, that she used for a long time was her own e-mail address because the one at the State level didn't work the way it should have, so she had to get her own. All right? And so you're e-mailing an address that sometimes works for her, sometimes it doesn't. So I understand where the confusion was about whether or not she was getting messages on OSCN. All right? I understand that.

But a discussion and a phone call will help to take care or dispel confusion. She's not going to get a phonecall when she's in here day after day transcribing.

MR. PLOURDE: I appreciate that.

THE COURT: All right? She's not.

MR. PLOURDE: I understand.

THE COURT: And it's going to be after hours 1 2 before she gets it. 3 MR. PLOURDE: I understand. THE COURT: So I wanted that to be on the 4 Ms. Plaxico, do you have anything to say? 5 record. MS. PLAXICO: Yes, Your Honor. If appropriate, 6 we would appreciate just a transcript of the ruling. 7 THE COURT: Which is what you asked for the last 8 9 time, wasn't it? 10 MS. PLAXICO: Exactly. 11 THE COURT: Okay. 12 MS. PLAXICO: Same story. Second verse. 13 THE COURT: All right. And then you --14 MR. PLOURDE: Just to be clear, we're asking for 15 an expedited transcript of the entire transcript. 16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. PLOURDE: And if that ruling is prepared in 18 advance of the expedited transcript, then we'd like 19 a copy of that as well. 20 THE COURT: All right. Because I think there was some mis-confusion about asking for a copy of 21 22 the ruling. 23 MR. PLOURDE: I thought we cleared it up the day 24 after. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's not the

impression I got from the filing to the Supreme Court that I saw this morning. That's not my impression.

So you can beat up on me all day long. I don't care. I've been up --

MR. PLOURDE: I don't plan to try and beat up on any judge.

THE COURT: I mean, it's okay. It's all right. That's what we're here for.

MR. PLOURDE: I'm not trying to beat up on your court reporter.

THE COURT: This is something the Supreme Court is going to have to make a determination on, based on what I did. I knew that when we came in here.

But I'm -- Don't mess with my staff. If you do, you're going to hear from me like you're hearing from me. And I understand your explanation, and I appreciate it. So I'm good now.

But when I read it, it appeared like it was an attack on my court reporter who, I see what she does and I see how late she works. And I see the toll it's taking on her. That's why we have to take breaks, because of her hands and her shoulders from the work that she's doing in here on days where we have hearings that go day after day after day like

that. All right? So all right. Anything further? MR. PLOURDE: No, Your Honor. MS. PLAXICO: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: You're welcome. MS. PLAXICO: Appreciate your time. All right. Court will be in recess. THE COURT: THE CLERK: All rise. (Whereupon, proceedings concluded at 11:06 a.m.) (End of Excerpt) 

## 1 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKLAHOMA COUNTY 2 STATE OF OKLAHOMA 3 UNITED METHODIST CHURCH OF THE SERVANT, an incorporated religious association acting by 4 and through its Board of 5 Trustees, 6 Plaintiff, 7 VS. CASE NO. CJ-2023-3704 8 THE OKLAHOMA ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, 9 INC., a domestic not for profit corporation; THE BOARD OF 10 TRUSTEES OF THE OKLAHOMA ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 11 METHODIST, INC., a domestic not for profit corporation, et al., 12 Defendants. 13 CERTIFICATE 14 I, Tara Nixon, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 15 Registered Professional Reporter, Certified Realtime Reporter, Certified Realtime Captioner, and Official 16 17 Court Reporter for Oklahoma County, do hereby 18 certify that the foregoing transcript in the 19 above-styled case is a true, correct, and partial 20 transcript of proceedings had on the 21st day of 21 August, 2023. Dated this 22<sup>nd</sup> 22 August 23 Tara Mixon, RPR. CRR alcre 24 State of Oktilahomaorthand Reporter Certified Shorthand Reporter 25 SR #1542